Везде
The Vatican in World War II: Dynamics and New Directions in Western Historiography
Table of contents
Annotation Estimate Publication content
References Comments
Share
QR
Metrics
The Vatican in World War II: Dynamics and New Directions in Western Historiography
Annotation
PII
S013038640018552-5-1
DOI
10.31857/S013038640018552-5
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Gregory Freeze 
Affiliation: Brandeis University
Address: Waltham, Massachusets, USA
Evgenia Tokareva
Affiliation: Institute of World History, RAS
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Ekaterina Zhdanova
Affiliation: Lomonosov Moscow State University
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Edition
Issue 2
Pages
5-23
Abstract

The article examines the historiography of the pontificate of Pope Pius XII, especially the phase that fell during the Second World War. Accusations that the Pope had not publicly condemned the crimes of Fascism and Nazism emerged in Soviet historiography shortly after the war and were faintly echoed by radical historiography in European countries. At the same time, an apologetic trend emerges in historiography. The situation changed dramatically with the publication and production of the play Der Stellvertreter. Ein christliches Trauerspiel (The Deputy, A Christian Tragedy also published in English as The Representative) by the German playwright Rolf Hochhuth, in which the Pope is accused of remaining silent in the face of the Nazi crimes. It marked the beginning of a critical trend in historiography. In historiography, a heated debate between the critical and apologetic ‘schools’ has been termed the “Pius War”. The revival of the critical movement has usually been associated with various politicised events such as the beatification process of Pius XII at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and a new step in that direction in 2009, namely the declaration of Pius XII venerable by Pope Benedict XVI, etc. At the same time, the introduction of new archival documents into scholarly discourse (in particular, the opening for academic examination of the collections of Pius XI and Pius XII in the Vatican Archives) has led to an enormous expansion and diversification of the source base. Studies have also demonstrated the need for a more active exploration and contextualisation of the policies of the Holy See during the war years. All this contributes to a more balanced and objective appraisal of these matters on the part of historians and political scientists.

Keywords
Pius XII, Vatican, Holy See, World War II, Catholic Church, Holocaust, modern historiography
Acknowledgment
This article is part of a project supported by the Russian Science Foundation (No. 19-18-00482), “Entangled Histories: Russia and the Holy See, 1917–1958”.
Received
10.02.2022
Date of publication
13.05.2022
Number of purchasers
12
Views
1029
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
Cite Download pdf
Additional services access
Additional services for the article
Services benefits
100 RUB / 1.0 SU
Additional services for the issue
Services benefits
970 RUB / 16.0 SU
Additional services for all issues for 2022
Services benefits
4365 RUB / 87.0 SU
1

The scholarship on the Vatican’s role in World War II has been as contentious as it has been prolific. Partly because of its purported relationship to Nazi Germany, partly because of its response to the Holocaust and other atrocities, the Holy See – and especially Pope Pius XII–became a focal point of controversy immediately after his death in 1958. The initial debate generated two distinct parties and so much acrimony that this phase in the early 1960s has been aptly named the “Pius War”. The public debate dropped off in the 1970s–1990s, but resumed with a vengeance in the late 1990s, with a second “Pius War” in the early 2000s. In the aftermath the public debate between “pro” and “anti” Pius parties was still underway but has since given way to a “non-party” school seeking to explain rather than to indict or exculpate. The intellectual level of these debates has steadily risen, as researchers gained greater access to the “Secret Archive” of the Vatican for the papacy of Pius XI and expanded the use of church, state, and private holdings across the globe. To be sure, language barriers have prevented both the universal use of these sources and the dissemination of scholarly works1. Nevertheless, the level of scholarly discourse has risen significantly. This paper will provide an overview of that debate, the argumentation and evidence that they advance, and the impact of the recent access to the archives from the papacy of Pius XII.

1. Neither Paul O’Shea’s monograph nor the prize-winning volume by David Kertzer use the sources and secondary literature in German. See: O’Shea P. A Cross Too Heavy: Pope Pius XII and the Jews of Europe. New York, 2011; Kertzer D. The Pope and Mussolini. The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe. New York, 2014. Hubert Wolf makes a similar complaint about Italian scholarship; see Wolf H. Papst Pius XII. und die Juden // Theologische Revue. 2009. Bd. 105. № 4. S. 275. Anm. 1.
2

Pius War I
3 Prior to his death on 9 October 1958, Pius XII (Eugenio Pacelli) had enjoyed a highly favorable press in the post-war era. He elicited not only the veneration of believers for his spirituality, but also praise from prominent Jewish leaders for his reputed role during World War II. The first biographies, published even before his death, were hagiographic in tone, such as that by Alden Hatch and Seamus Walshe in 19572. The most striking exception came from the Soviet bloc, especially East Germany, most notably in M.M. Scheinmann’s book, which claimed that Pacelli had allied with Nazi Germany to combat communism and ignored the murder of Jews to maintain that alliance3. Negative assessments also appeared in Italy. For example, Ernesto Buonaiuti’s biography4 was critical of the activities aimed at preserving the traditions of the Catholic Church and at reviving the special role of the pontiff as a sovereign in the Catholic world.
2. Hatch A., Walshe S. Crown of Glory: The Life of Pope Pius XII. New York, 1957. Significantly, the authors claim to have had some assistance from the Vatican archives in preparing this biography.

3. Scheinmann M.M. Das Vatikan im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin, 1954.

4. Buonaiuti E. Pio XII. Firenze, 1958.
4 That critique informed the infamous play by Rolf Hochhuth, The Deputy, written in 1959 and performed first on 20 February 19635. Hochhuth claimed that a vigorous protest from the papacy could have significantly reduced the scale of the Holocaust. In Act 4, dramatically, a Jesuit comes to the Vatican to report the systematic annihilation of Jews but met with cold indifference on the part of Pius XII. The latter was just then receiving a large sum of money from industries that profited from slave labor and explained that the Nazis were the best defense against Bolshevism, the greatest threat of all. The published text was no ordinary play; if performed according to the published text it would run about seven to eight hours. But that invited a variety of cuts and adaptations as the play was performed throughout West Germany and elsewhere in the West. It had the dramatic effect of putting the “Pius XII question” on the public agenda. The play caused such a resonance that the German government was forced to publicly distance itself from it. The campaign culminated in Italy with the foreword to the Italian translation of the play by the rector of the University of Urbino, Carlo Bo, who claimed that Hochhut's play is well documented6.
5. Hochhuth R. Der Stellvertreter: Schauspiel. Reinbeck bei Hamburg, 1963.

6. See: Preziosi G. Dossier Pio XII: Mezzo secolo di leggenda nera e di dibattito storiografico alla prova degli archivi // Christianitas. Rivista di Storia Pensiero e Cultura del Cristianesimo. 2013. № 1. P. 188.
5 The public quickly divided into two polarized camps–those condemning and those defending the pope. The most vociferous attack on the Church came from Guenther Lewy, a German Jewish immigrant to the United States who earned a PhD at Columbia and made an academic career (University of Massachusetts at Amherst). Drawing upon non-Vatican sources (but some diocesan archives in Germany), Lewy produced a highly polemical attack on the Church in general and Pius XII in particular for failing to oppose the Holocaust7. The pope’s defenders of Pius were no less vitriolic. Walter Adolph’s Verfälschte Geschichte (“Falsified History”, with the subtitle: “Response to Rolf Hochhuth, with documents and authentic reports”), exposed the factual errors and distortions in the Hochhuth play8. In June 1963 Giovanni Montini (who had worked closely with Pacelli throughout the 1930s and 1940s and who, that same month, as elected to the pontificate as Paul VI) published an article in The Tablet (a leading Catholic organ published in London) that vigorously defended Pius XII9. Historians, such as, for example, Pietro Pastorelli10 and Mario Toscano11, quickly refuted Hochhut's accusations with a more accurate and reasonable reading of the facts and documents. Hochhut was also accused of being an agent of East Germany or the USSR and acting in their favor. The Catholic press called the play a monstrous provocation intended to satisfy the Marxists’ hatred of the Papacy and characterized it as the greatest lie of the century12. But many liberal historians (for example, Giovanni Spadolini), also characterized criticism of Pius XII as communist propaganda Pius XII.
7. Lewy G. The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany. New York, 1964.

8. Adolph W. Verfälschte Geschichte; Antwort an Rolf Hochhuth, mit Dokumenten und authentischen Berichten. Berlin, 1963.

9. See the discussion and quotations in: Feldkamp M. Papst XII. Ein Papst für Deutschland, Europa und die Welt. Aachen, 2018. S. 161.

10. Pastorelli P. Pio XII e la politica internazionale // Pio XII. A cura di A. Riccardi. Bari; Roma, 1984, P. 125–147.

11. Toscano M. La Santa Sede e le vittime del nazismo // L’Osservatore della Domenica. 1964. Vol. 26. P. 65–67.

12. См.: Triulcio P. La Storia come fine o come mezzo? Una riflessione sui presunti “silenzi” di Pio XII // Vivarium. 2019. Vol. 27. P. 131–134. For example, Preciozi cites the story that three agents of the KGB, under the guise of being priests, were sent to the Vatican with the task of copying the secret documents of Pius XII. However, they did not succeed in finding any compromising material, so some falsified and manipulated documents were created and these became the basis of Hochhut’s play.
6 All this formed part of a fierce public debate, which is reflected in the compilation of essays published by Erich Bentley in 196413. The decision in 1965 to initiate the canonization procedure for Pius XII only added fuel to the fire, as reflected the collection of documents by the Saul Friedlander14. It should be noted that Friedlander himself was a pupil of a Catholic boarding school near the Swiss border during the war, but his parents, who were unable to leave France, died in the concentration camp at Auschwitz.
13. Bentley E. The Storm over the Deputy. Essays and Articles about Hochhuth’s Explosive Drama. New York, 2004.

14. Friedlander S. Pius XII und das Dritte Reich: eine Dokumentation. Hamburg, 1965.
7 In response to the heated rhetoric and dearth of hard historical data, the Catholic Church undertook to expand the pool of available sources. To circumvent the seventy-five-year rule on archival access, Pope Paul VI appointed a team of four Jesuits to work through the Vatican archives on the war years and publish relevant documents. The result was an multivolume series, Acts et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale (hereafter ADSS), which appeared from 1965 to 1981, with publication of 5,108 documents in the original language15. Despite complaints that the series omits crucial documents and, contrariwise, that many scholars have made too little use of this vast corpus, for most serious scholars this is the foundation of substantial research, including the record of incoming warnings about the Nazi campaign to exterminate the Jewish and other groups16. No less significant was the initiative undertaken by the Catholic Academy in Munich, which established a “Commission for Contemporary History” in 1962 to compile and publish its own series of primary sources17. These included a three-volume collection of documents on Vatican-German relations18, a six-volume collection of documents from the German episcopate19, and an annotated German translation of Pacelli’s letters to German bishops during the war20. Impressive too was the massive project to study the resistance and repression of Catholic clergy; from an initial edition in 1985 (which revealed approximately 4,000 priests subjected to repression), by the fourth edition in 1998 that number had grown to some 12,00021. Given the centrality of Germany and especially National Socialism in the “Pius Question”, all these constitute an invaluable complement to the Vatican collection, ADSS.
15. Acts et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale (hereafter ADDS) / eds P. Blet, R. Graham, A. Martini, B. Schneider. Vol. 1–11. Vatican City, 1965–1980.

16. Scholars have repeatedly complained about the failure to mine this important source. That impelled one of the four compilers, Pierre Blet, to publish a one-volume summary in French, which then appeared in English and German as well. Blet P. Pius XII and the Second World War. According to the Archives of the Vatican. New York, 1997.

17. Kösters Ch. Catholics in the Third Reich: An Introduction to the Scholarship and Research History // Catholics and the Third Reich. Hummel / eds K.-J. Hummel, M. Kißener. Boston, 2018. P. 43.

18. Der Notenwechsel zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und der Deutschen Regierung / hg. D. Albrecht, U. von Hehl. Bd. 1–3. Mainz, 1965–1980.

19. Akten deutscher Bischöfe über die Lage der Kirche 1933 bis 1945. Bd. 1–6 / hg. B. Stasiewski, V. Ludwig. Mainz, 1968–1985.

20. Die Briefe Piur‘ XII. an die deutschen Bischöfe 1939–1944 / hg. В. Schneider, P. Blet, A. Martini. Mainz, 1966.

21. Hehl U. von et al. Priester unter Hitlers Terror. Eine biographische und statistische Erhebung. Bd. 1–2. Paderborn, 1998. Suffice it to say that the two volumes encompass 1,984 pages (with massive statistical tables and individual biographies for each of the priests subjected to form of repression).
8 In the wake of the Pius War, the highly partisan scholarship did not disappear, as the pro- and anti-Pius parties continued to wage battle22. But the available of new sources did lead to more measured, “non-party” research and writing. Two important exemplars are Owen Chadwick and Konrad Repgen. Chadwick (an Anglican priest and renowned professor of church history at Cambridge University) published a study on Vatican-British relations during the Second World War. Drawing upon ADSS but especially the diary of d’Arcy Osborne (British ambassador to the Vatican, 1935–1947), Chadwick defends Pius XII against the Hochhuth attack, while admitting the pope’s shortcomings (including a penchant for florid circumlocutions). But Chadwick defends the decision to maintain the Vatican’s neutrality and highlights the Vatican’s role in providing considerable assistance to the Jews. And Chadwick also questions the value of a provocative public declaration, asking “what could [the pope] effectively do”23. Repgen, a conservative historian at Bonn University, published a volume devoted specifically to the Kristallnacht and the Catholic Church’s response24. He also made a close analysis of the German episcope during the war, showing their disunity (a third of whom firmly opposed a public condemnation of the Nazis) as the reason for their inability to adopt a common position or to trigger a more vigorous response from the papacy25.
22. The most prominent of the pro-Pius advocates has been Pave the Way Foundation, founded by an American Jewish entrepreneur, Gary Wills. Its goal is to dismantle “obstacles” to inter-confessional reconciliation, and it has made the defense of Pius XII a key focus. It has collected materials in his defense and even succeeded in persuading the Israeli holocaust museum, Vad Yashem, to revise its original damnatory characterization of Pius XII. See: >>>> (access date: 17.10.2020).

23. Chadwick O. Britain and the Vatican during the Second World War. New York, 1986.

24. Repgen K. Judenpogrom, Rassenideologie und Katholische Kirche. 1938. Köln, 1988.

25. Repgen K. Die deutschen Bischöfe und der Zweite Weltkrieg // Annuario de historia de la Iglesia. 1995. Vol. 4. S. 97–146.
9 Despite the source publications and more temperate tone of these years, a new – and even more vitriolic–Pius War erupted again at the turn of the century. The trigger was John Cornwell’s Hitler’s Pope, a bestseller in 1999 that provided a blistering denunciation of Pius XII. Cornwell (a non-academic administrator at Cambridge University) made his career as a journalist and provided a vivid, but unscholarly portrait that failed to use the key sources published in the previous decades. The argument was new, however: in contrast to earlier anti-Pius literature (attributing Pius XII’ purported “silence” to antisemitism or anticommunist monomania), Cornwell portrayed the pope as an authoritarian obsessed with preserving papal primacy26. In 2002 Daniel Goldhagen published a tract that explained Pius’ behavior by antisemitism; despite his dubious reputation in scholarly circles27, his attack on the Vatican appeared in a major commercial press and thereby enjoyed a wide distribution28. The accusation of anti-Semitism, however, was quite characteristic of the negative assessments of Pius XII. This accusation, for example, also appeared in the work of the well-known Italian radical journalist, Ernesto Rossi29, who claimed that anti-Semitism was originally inherent in the Catholic Church and provided one of the foundations of fascist racism. This claim was subsequently repeated by many Italian researchers.
26. Cornwell J. Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII. New York, 1999. Cornwell subsequently claimed that he had been misunderstood and denied that he had “characterized Eugenio Pacelli as a Nazi sympathizer and a rabid anti-Semite.... I believe now, as I did when this book was first published, that Eugenio Pacelli was Hitler’s Pope not because he favored Hitler (which he did not) nor because he was anti-Semitic (which he was not, although he displayed an anti-Jewishness typical among Catholics of his times), but because he was an ideal church leader for Hitler’s purposes.” See the “Preface to the 2008 Edition” in ibid., reprint (New York, 2008), p. XII.

27. Goldhagen D. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York, 1996. Was the target of almost universal vilification among scholars.

28. Goldhagen Dl. A Moral Reckoning: The Role of the Catholic Church in the Holocaust and Its Unfulfilled Duty of Repair. New York, 2002.

29. Rossi E. Il manganello e l’aspersorio. Rome, 1957.
10 David Kertzer (Brown University) published a more scholarly treatise that traced the history of antisemitism in the Catholic church and portrayed traditional religious “anti-Judaism” as a precursor and progenitor of the Nazi’s racist antisemitism30. Susan Zuccotti examined events in Rome in 1943, when the German occupation forces deported more than a thousand Jews and argued that the pope made no attempt to resist or protest. She concedes that many bishops and priests did intercede to help Jews but claims that they did so at their own initiative–not because of a directive from Pius XII31. However, the Italian researchers G. Sale and Alberto Bobbio32 claims that such an instruction was sent by the pope to various monasteries with the condition, however, that this letter would be immediately burned.
30. Kertzer D. The Popes against the Jews: The Vatican’s Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism. New York, 2001. For a lacerating critique, see: Lawler J. Were the Popes against the Jews? Tracking the Myths, Confronting the Ideologues. Grand Rapids (MI), 2012.

31. Zuccotti S. Under His Very Window: The Vatican and the Holocaust in Italy. New Haven, 2000.

32. Bobbio A. Oltre la barriera del pericolo // Jesus. 2004. Vol. 2. P. 65; Sale G., Bobbio A. La Chiesa e la “Shoah”. Resistenza in convent // Jesus. 2004. Vol. 2. Р. 62–68.
11 One of the largest and most resonant works of this period is the book by Giovanni Miccoli “The Dilemmas and Silences of Pius XII”33. The reviewer of the book, Daniele Santarelli Miccoli, considered the position of Pius XII (as well as the Catholic Church as a whole), his neutrality, and silence to be the result of a long ideological and diplomatic tradition that was simply incapable of coping with the fascist challenge and defending the victims of Nazism.
33. Miccoli G. I dilemmi e i silenzi di Pio XII. Vaticano, Seconda guerra mondiale e Shoah. Milano, 2000.
12 The pro-Pius party fought back. The works of David Dalin (a rabbi) and Ronald Rychlak (a lawyer) were typical. In dissecting the Cornwell volume, Dalin argued that Pacelli was a consistent foe of the Nazis, as evidence by the fact that the latter indeed castigated the pope as a “Jew-loving cardinal”34. Rychlak refuted assertions about the pope’s “silence,” antisemitism, and fear for his own safety35. The German academic Michael Feldkamp (Ph.D. from the University of Bonn, employee of the Bundestag) produced a systematic critique of Goldhagen itemizing the “falsifications” in his account36. Essay collections and biographies also came to Pius’ defense37. As the Pius party complained, however, Pius’s detractors had at their disposal the major commercial presses, whereas his supporters were relegated to tiny religious presses with little visibility and scanty distribution38. The Israeli diplomat Pinches Lapide published a particularly strong defense of Pius and claimed that he had saved up to 850,000 Jewish lives39.
34. Dalin D. The Myth of Hitler’s Pope. Washington, 2005. See also the critique in: Brechenmacher Th. Pius XII. und kein Ende // Das historisch-politische Buch. 2000. Bd. 48. S. 95–103.

35. Rychlak R. Hitler, the War, and the Pope. Huntington (IN), 2000. Later Rychlak explicitly made the case for Pius’s canonization: Righteous Gentiles: How Pius XII and the Catholic Church Saved Half a Million Jews from the Nazis. Dallas, 2005. See also McInerny R. The Defamation of Pius XII. South Bend (IN), 2001.

36. Feldkamp M. Goldhagens unwillige Kirche. Alte und neue Fälschungen über Kirche und Papst während der NS-Herrschaft. München, 2004.

37. Pius XII, the Holocaust and the Revisionists / ed. P. Gallo. Jefferson (NC), 2006. For a collection of trenchant critiques of the anti-Pius party, see: The Pius War: Responses to the Critics of Pius XII / eds J. Bottum, D. Dalin. Lanham, 2004. For an admiring biography, see: Marchione M. Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace. Makwah (NJ), 2000.

38. Bottum J. The End of the Pius Wars // First Things. 2004. Vol. 142. P. 18–24.

39. Lapide P. Three Popes and the Jews. New York, 1967.
13 If nothing else, the “second Pius War” impelled the Vatican to open more of its archival holdings: initially in 2003 and fully in 2006, all the files (some 100,000 archival units) became available for the papacy of Pius XI (1922–1939). This provided new insights into the workings of the papal administration, its response to critical questions like fascism, and the role and posture of Pacelli–first as papal nuncio in Germany (to 1929), then as state secretary in the 1930s. That broader access did not apply to the papacy of Pius XII (1939–1958) but encouraged researchers to historicize his papacy–to determine Pacelli’s attitudes toward such critical issues as fascism and his role in drafting critical encyclicals and pronouncements from Pius XI. For example, one of the most famous Italian researchers, Andrea Riccardi, in “The Longest winter. 1943–1944. Pius XII, Jews and Nazis in Rome”40 placed the pontificate of Pius XII in a broader historical context–that is, he tried to consider it through the prism of a very complex reality of this time, both in international terms and in connection with the internal problems of the church. The same is true of the work of Philippe Chenauх, “Pius XII. The Diplomat and the Pastor”41, which likewise examines the pontificate of Pius XII through the prism of international events and the evolution of Pope Pacelli's career within the Vatican hierarchy. Chenault argued that during the years of Pacelli's pontificate, the Church was faced with a double challenge–war and totalitarianism–and thus the question of the pope's silence must be considered within this larger context.
40. Riccardi A. L’inverno piu lungo. 1943–44: Pio XII, gli ebrei e i nazisti a Roma. Roma, 2008.

41. Chenaux P. Pio XII. Diplomatico e pastore. Cinisello Balsamo, 2004; Idem. L’eredità del magistero di Pio XII. Roma, 2010.
14 Parallel to that, German scholars systematically began putting documentation online–Pacelli’s reports as nuncio42, a scholarly edition of Pacelli’s report on the German church in 1929 (at the conclusion of his service as nuncio in Berlin)43, and the diary of the prominent prelate in Munich, Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber44.
42. Kritische Online-Edition der Nuntiaturberichte Eugenio Pacellis (1917–1929) // URL: >>>> (access date: 22.12.2022).

43. Eugenio Pacelli. Die Lage der Kirche in Deutschland 1929 / hg. H. Wolf, K. Unterburger. Paderborn, 2006.

44. Kritische Online-Edition der Tagebücher Michael Kardinal von Faulhabers (1911–1952) // URL: >>>> (access date: 12.11.2022).
15 This surge of new archival access had a major impact on the scholarship: professional historians now brought new information and new insights to bear on the much-debated questions about the Vatican–and Pacelli–during the 1920s and1930s. In the face of new archival finds, Cornwell softened his conclusion slightly. In an interview with the Economist (11 December 2004), he admitted that the pope had a limited possibility of action, given that he was subject first to the rule of the Mussolini regime and then the Nazi occupation. The conference held by the Argentine Institute of Culture and the Center for Italian-German Studies, and the subsequent publication of its materials showed that scholars have been seeking to be less biased and more attentive to the documentary base45. The proceedings of a conference in 2012 showed that the two parties (critics and supporters) were still active, but the tenor and scholarly level was significantly higher than in past years46.
45. Pio XII. Il dibattito storiografico: punti di arrivo e problemi aperti. Atti del convegno. Trento, 2005.

46. Pius XII and the Holocaust. Current State of Research / eds D. Bankier, D. Michman, I. Nidam-Orvieto. Jerusalem, 2012. For a historiographic overview see: Johnson W. Blood Libel and the Pius War: A Bibliographic Review of the Roman Catholic Church and the Holocaust // Journal of Religious & Theological Information. 2020. Vol. 19. P. 57–69.
16 Some scholarship, however, has remained highly critical of Pius XII. Michael Phayer (Marquette University) argues that the pope’s decision-making was driven by a strong anticommunism, which was reinforced by a determination to protect the institutional interests of the Church and by a traditional religious (“supersessionist”) antisemitism. Phayer does, however, break with some tenets of the anti-Pius camp: he rejects the “silence” accusation and concedes that Pius did play an active role in helping Jews. Nonetheless, Phayer argues that Pius could and should have done more to oppose the Nazi genocide. Although Phayer did use some previously untapped materials from the U.S. National Archives, he failed to draw upon the newly opened Vatican archives on the 1930s47. Harsh critics include Marcus Aurelius Rivelli, who not only renewed, but also strengthened the accusations against Pacelli, which is evident from the very title of the book48. A new wave of acrimonious controversy ensued when the Church took the next step in the process of beatification of Pius XII: the decree of Benedict XVI (19 December 2009) pronounced Pius XII to be “venerable”.
47. Phayer M. Pius XII, the Holocaust and the Cold War. Bloomington, 2008. In an earlier study Phayer was distinctly more negative, arguing that even if Pius could not have halted the Holocaust, he could have mobilized religious leaders around the world and significantly reduced its magnitude. Phayer M. The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930–1945. Bloomington, 2000.

48. Rivelli M. Dio e con noi: la Chiesa di Pio XII complice del nazifascismo. Milano, 2002.
17 The Australian historian, Paul O’Shea, rejects the hardline anti-Pius school (such as Cornwell’s Hitler’s Pope) and confirms that the pope opposed the Nazis and sought to help the Jews. O’Shea also emphasizes Pacelli’s conservative antimodernist views and hostility to the modern, liberal nation-state. Above all, the pope did only what was consistent with the Church’s political interests and its capacity to serve the needs and ensure the salvation of its flock49. Klaus Kühlwein (a lay administrator in the diocese of Freiburg im Breisgau) remains far more critical of Pius XII. In an early self-published book, he castigates the pope for his response to the Rome deportations (which he characterizes as the pope’s “greatest mistake”), and his 2018 monograph draws upon the array of new Vatican sources to buttress that negative view50.
49. O’Shea P. Op. cit.

50. Kühlwein K. Pius XII. und die Deportation der Juden Roms. Berlin, 2019. His earlier (self-published) volume bore the unambiguous title: Idem. Papst Pius XII. – sein schwerster Fehler: die Deportation der römischen Juden nach Auschwitz. Freiburg im Breisgau, 2011.
18 Most of the scholarship, however, is broadly favorable toward Pacelli, even if couched with some reservations. Thomas Brechenmacher (University of Potsdam) is perhaps the strongest defender of the pope. Apart from rebutting the myth of Pacelli’s “silence”, and an alleged affinity of the Vatican for fascist regimes, Brechenmacher argues that the pope managed to maintain neutrality, but actively worked to ameliorate the Jews’ plight. The case involving the bishop of Utrecht in July 1942 heightened the fear of making things worse: in response to the bishop’s protest against the deportation of Jews, the Nazis increased the number of victims by adding Jewish converts, including Edith Stein51. Hence Pius refrained from a public denunciation only to avoid making matters worse52. Hence his favorite phrase to characterize his approach: ad maiora mala vitenda53.
51. Repgen K. Die deutschen Bischöfe… S. 132.

52. Brechenmacher Th. The Church and the Jews // Catholics and the Third Reich / eds K.-J. Hummel, M. Kißener. Boston, 2018. P. 127–145; Idem. The Papacy and the Second World War // Ibid. P. 181–197.

53. Wolf H. Papst Pius XII. und die Juden. S. 274.
19 Giovanni Maria Vian published a collection of articles under the characteristic title “In defense of Pius XII”54. The book also contains new arguments that the critical attitude towards the pontificate of Pacelli is primarily due to its comparison with the subsequent pontificate of Pope John XXIII. According to Vian, the change in the image of Pius XII in the historiography of the mid–1960s was due to his anti-communism and the contrast to Pope John XXIII, who remained in history as a “good pope” (il papa buono). Vian also connects this opposition with the divergence of the points of view of “progressives” and “conservatives”, which was manifested during the preparation and during the Second Vatican Council itself.
54. In difesa di Pio XII. Le ragioni della storia / a cura di G.M. Vian. Venezia, 2009.
20 Along with the key questions of the attitude of Pius XII and the Catholic Church to fascism, Nazism and the Holocaust, some researchers have also focused on local problems, notably in the Balkans. At issue is the pope's silence regarding the genocide of the Serbs after the Ustashe government came to power in the Independent State of Croatia. This topic was first raised in the early 1950s after the trial of Cardinal Aloisie Stepinac, Archbishop of Zagreb in 1937–1960. It also reappeared with new intensity after the beatification of Stepinac in 1998 (for example, in the book by Carlo Falconi55). The fate of the Serbs under the Ustashe rule was also the subject of Edmond Paris’s study, “Genocide in Allied Croatia, 1941–1945”56. In contrast to earlier works, Paris gave attention to wartime newspapers and magazines (Catholic and secular), which made it possible to consider the problem more broadly and to consider the entire war period. In 1981 Lazo Kostic57 again raised the issue of Catholic participation in the mass conversion of Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism in the Balkans. Considering the interaction of the Curia with the Episcopate of Croatia, Kostic argues that the pope did everything possible to “ignore the terrible murders and violence perpetrated by Catholic statesmen, national leaders, dictators, and generals (from the Pavelic-Tiso-Mussolini-Franco-Salazar series and Adolf Hitler himself)58. This idea was further developed in Marc Aurelio Riveli’s work, “The Archbishop of Genocide. Monsignor Stepinac, the Vatican and the Ustashe dictatorship in Croatia 1941–1945”59. The Vatican, according to Riveli, was impressed by the creation of a Catholic state that could serve as a protective block against godless communism coming from the east. Riveli shows that Pius XII was aware of the Balkan problem and by his silence became a kind of accomplice to the events. Prof. Srboljub Zivanovic (Oxford University) made a report on the relations between the Catholic Church and the Serbs in Croatia at the conference dedicated to the Orthodox-Catholic dialogue and the role of Catholic priests, sisters, Kryzhars and Catholics in general in the genocide against Serbs, Jews and Gypsies60. The main conclusion of research on the Jasenovac concentration camp and the actions of the Catholic clergy was that clergy were personally involved in the mass murders (according to this study, 1171 Catholic priests participated in the mistreatment and murder of Orthodox Serbs) and that the Vatican itself was involved (notably, in the audience given to Pavelic by the pontiff in May 1941 as recognition of the Independent State of Croatia). The idea of the Vatican’s culpability also appears in 2013 in Dinko Davidov’s book”61, which is accompanied by an extensive illustrative material depicting mass killings and destruction on the territory of Yugoslavia. This research also drew on the diary of Aloysius Stepinac as well as local newspapers; like his predecessors, the author sees a close connection between the Catholic Croatian clergy and Ante Pavelic, the head of Croatia.
55. Falconi C. Il silenzio di Pio XII. Milano, 1965.

56. Paris E. Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941–1945. Chicago, 1962.

57. Kostich L. M. The Holocaust in the “Independent state of Croatia”. Chicago, 1981.

58. Ibid. Р. 77.

59. Ривели М. Архиепископ геноцида: Монсеньор Степинац, Ватикан и усташская диктатура в Хорватии 1941–1945 гг. М., 2011.

60. Живанович С. Православно-католический диалог и роль католических священников, честных сестер, крыжаров и католиков вообще в геноциде над сербами, евреями и цыганами // Доклад на международной историко-богословской конференции «Православно-католический диалог после Ясеноваца» 28.10.2010. URL: >>>> (access date: 14. 05. 2017).

61. Davidov D. Independent State of Croatia: Total genocide. 1941–1945. Belgrade, 2013.
21 Another less global issue is the question of the Vatican's participation in the organization of escape routes from Europe – the so-called “rat trails”, along which the Jews had moved and were then followed by Nazis. In fact, the work of M. Aarons and J.R. Tolkien was specifically devoted to the rat trails62. By this time, enough material had already accumulated in the form of memoirs and interviews that seemed to demonstrate the Vatican’s involvement in the escape of Nazi criminals (for example, S. Gitta’s interview of Nazi survivors). When asked what was the benefit for the Holy See from such a policy, the authors argue that the main goal of the Vatican was to preserve the freedom of those people who willingly propagandized anticommunist ideas (whether they be a Nazi nor not). The opening of the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina made it possible to study rat trails from a new perspective. The work of Uka Gonya63, an Argentine researcher, is devoted to the activities of the Catholic clergy in Argentina to organize escape routes for former fascists. Gonyi claims that the Vatican put pressure on Latin American countries to open their borders to fugitive war criminals or those who were anticommunists. The pro-fascist government of Peron to realizing this plan. Gonyi also made a detailed study of the trail leading from Spain to Latin America. The Vatican's opposition to communism and its participation in organizing the rat trails is also the subject of research by P.P. Krasnov64 on Vatican-Argentine relations. Р.Р. Krasnov further argues that the main organizer was the United States, which sought to benefit from the flight of scientists and military strategists. The main goal of the Holy See was to save the Catholic population from Nazification, Bolshevization, and also to enable Catholics to find refuge outside Europe. According to this view, the Vatican did not prioritize Nazism and communism, but considered both a threat to the Catholic Church.
62. Aarons M., Loftus J. Unholy Trinity: The Vatican, the Nazis, and the Swiss Banks. New York, 1998.

63. Goñi U. The Real Odessa. New York, 2002.

64. Краснов П.П. Трансатлантическая дипломатия папы Пия XII и Ф. Рузвельта в период Второй мировой войны // Вестник Оренбургского государственного университета. 2010. № 5. С. 4–11; Его же. Деятельность Ватикана в Нюрнбергском процессе: к постановке вопроса // Грамота. 2011. № 2. С. 94–96; Его же. Окно в Америку: дипломатия кардинала Пачелли // Интеллект. Инновации. Инвестиции. 2011. № 1. С. 160–163; Его же. Папа римский Пий XII в советской и российской историографии // Социальные исследования социальных проблем. 2012. № 4 (12). URL: >>>> (дата обращения: 17.10.2020).
22 A leading historian in contemporary scholarship is Hubert Wolf–a professor of church history at Münster and ordained priest, with very liberal views (including the need to modify the celibacy mandate)65. Wolf has worked intensively in the newly accessible Vatican archives and, indeed, his research team had a privileged position when the section on Pius XII was briefly opened in March 2020. His first major monograph, drawing heavily on the Pius XI archive, emphasized the need for objectivity and balanced analysis. It demonstrated that Pacelli was adamantly critical of the Nazis (from their very appearance in the 1920s) – contrary to claims that Pacelli’s anticommunist impelled him to seek an accommodation with the Nazis. Wolf also refutes earlier assertions that, to win Nazi agreement to the Concordat, Pacelli arranged the dissolution of the Center Party and thereby facilitated establishment of a single-party dictatorship. On the contrary, Pacelli had opposed that step, since it took away a significant part of his negotiating leverage. Wolf also rejects the blanket accusations of antisemitism and, while conceding that Pacelli was not free of antisemitic sentiments, emphasizes that these were marginal and irrelevant to his decision-making. Wolf draws upon ADDS to demonstrate that the Vatican had indeed received multiple reports in 1942 about the Nazi extermination camps. Apart from suspicions about the reliability of such reports, in Wolf’s view the key factor was Pius’s determination to remain impartial, meaning that he could denounce war crimes but that he must not name names. That impartiality served to preserve a potential role as a mediator of peace. Like others who have drawn on the Pius XI archival materials, Wolf emphasizes the experience and views that Pacelli had developed before his election to the papacy at age 62. Critical here was the memory of the Bismarckian Kulturkampf (which deprived believers of churches and therefore the sacraments essential for salvation), the experience of a failed peace mission in World War I, and the mentorship of his predecessor Pietro Gasparri66.
65. Hubert Wolf sieht, Systemkrisis der Männerkirche‘ // Kirche+Leben. 16.X.2019.

66. Wolf H. Papst & Teufel: Die Archive des Vatikan und das Dritte Reich. München, 2008; Idem, Papst Pius XII. und die Juden // Theologische Revue. 2009. Bd. 105. № 4. S. 265–280.
23 The recent scholarship includes two full-length biographies, both favorably disposed, if with some reservations. Robert Ventresca (Western University, Canada) has published a biography that has been widely accepted for its scholarly merits. Ventresca acquits the pope of most charges, but admits that he failed to recognize “how unprecedented the situation” was in Nazi Germany67. Like most others, the Ventresca biography emphasizes the formative experiences of Pacelli’s early service in shaping his view of Vatican strategy. But that strategy still allowed for local initiative, with discretion left to diocesan authorities to decide what level of opposition to the Nazis would be effective. As Ventresca points out, that approach–however rational came at the cost of Vatican respectability: “His insistence on maintaining the public face of impartiality undermined the political credibility of the papacy, and worse yet, left the institution vulnerable to the charge that he had failed the test of moral leadership at one of humanity’s darkest hours”68. The second biography, by Frank Coppa (St. John’s University, New York), likewise emphasizes the pre-papal experience as formative in shaping Pacelli’s commitment to impartiality. While that obligation did not preclude making moral judgments, impartiality meant that the pope, as the father of all, must remain neutral and not name specific offenders. However, this still left room for indirect messaging–through pronouncements by Vatican Radio and through local initiative by diocesan authorities. As Pius repeatedly argued, he was intent on avoiding actions that would make things worse (by provoking Nazi retaliation). As he wrote in response to one report, urging a public defense of the Jews, “a protest from me would not only not help anyone, but would arouse the most ferocious anger against the Jews and multiply acts of cruelty because they are undefended”. Moreover, the experience of filing protests after the Concordat had taught prelates that such written complaints were to no effect whatsoever69. A breach of neutrality, moreover, would obviate any chance of mediating the conflict and eliminate any chance for the Vatican to serve as an impartial mediator to end the conflict. A further restraint was the fact that Catholics indeed were fighting on both sides of the conflict, and implicitly the pope feared that his public statement might alienate believers (who already had to choose between faith and patriotism)70.
67. Matthias Sickler likewise chastised the Vatican for failing to realize that the Third Reich was not a normal state like that under the old regime. See: Sickler M. Collaboration or Ideological Distance? Catholic Church and Nazi State // Catholics and the Third Reich / eds K.-J. Hummel, M. Kißener. Boston, 2018. P. 85–101. See also Besier G., Piombo F. Der Heilige Stuhl und Hitler. München, 2004.

68. Ventresca R. The Life of Pope Pius XII. Cambridge, 2013.

69. See: Repgen K. Die deutschen Bischöfe… S. 112–115.

70. Coppa F.J. Pope Pius XII: From the Diplomacy of Impartiality to the Silence of the Holocaust // Journal of Church and State. 2011. Vol. 55. P. 286–306; Idem. The Life & Pontificate of Pope Pius XII. Between History and Controversy. Washington, 2013.
24 Research on German Catholics during the war show that Pius had good reason to fear alienating believers. In a study of Rheinland-Westphalia Thomas Brodie (University of Birmingham) found that the laity embraced both a Catholic and German identity, accepted the war as defensive and therefore just, and therefore affirmed their patriotic duty to serve. Precisely that fusion of faith and patriotism impelled most German prelates, who personally were unenthusiastic about the war (which they regarded as divine punishment), to avoid protests against Nazi atrocities, even if perpetrated against co-religionists in Poland, not to mention Jews at home and abroad. Significantly, Bishop Clemens August von Galen, celebrated as the “lion of Münster for his public denunciation of Nazi euthanasia, derived his popularity mainly from patriotic sermons in support of the war71”. Jacques Kornberg (professor of Jewish history at the University of Toronto) has explicitly argued that the Vatican refrained from publicly denouncing Nazi war crimes specifically for fear of offending patriotic Catholics devoted the cause of Germany if not National Socialism. In The Pope’s Dilemma, Kornberg argues that Pius had to choose between his ecclesiastical responsibility (to protect and preserve the Church) and his moral responsibility (to speak out)–and Pius XII chose the former72.
71. The dissertation was published as: Brodie T. German Catholicism at War, 1939–1945. Oxford, 2018. Indeed, according to police reports, Galen’s sermons even elicited jeering among the faithful. Repgen K. Die deutschen Bischöfe… S. 122.

72. Kornberg J. The Pope’s Dilemma: Pius XII Faces Atrocities and Genocide in the Second World War. Buffalo (NY), 2015.
25 Emphasis on the prewar experience has generated closer attention to the institutions and politics of decision-making in the Vatican. John Pollard (Cambridge University) argues that the years 1914–1958 constitute a single period and that the contrast between Pius XI and Pius XII is overdrawn. He also discerns a remarkable continuity in personnel, emphasizing the transformative role of Pietro Gasparri (secretary of state, 1914–1930), Bernadino Nogara (lay financial adviser, 1929–1954), Wlodimir Ledóchowski (superior general of the Society of Jesus, 1915–1942), and of course Eugenio Pacelli (papal nuncio to Germany, 1917–1929; secretary of state, 1930–1939), among others. While not uncritical of Pacelli (portrayed as too much diplomat, too little moral leader during the Holocaust), Pollard offers a favorable assessment of his role during the 1930s and the war. He categorically rejects the “legend” that Pacelli was soft on Nazi Germany (because of a presumed obsession with communism) and attributes his public reticence both to his hope to serve as a neutral peacemaker and his reluctance to force German Catholics to choose between their faith and their country. Pollard also shares the view that the pope played a major role in helping Jews and in fact saved hundreds of thousands of lives73.
73. Pollard J. The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, 1914–1958. Oxford, 2014.
26 Recent scholarship has also emphasized the Church’s and clergy’s resistance to fascism. The most sensational is a comprehensive study of the pope’s support for German opposition to Hitler, beginning with the first attempt by military leaders to depose him in 1939–1940 in hopes of reaching a separate, favorable peace with the Allies. Reports about the Vatican’s clandestine role here had circulated earlier, and Mark Riebling’s Church of Spies provides the fullest account, his findings admittedly tentative (pending full access to the Pius XII archive)74. The Vatican, at great risk, served as an intermediary between the two sides, and although the conspiracy did not pan out, it demonstrated Pacelli’s animus toward the Nazis–precisely the opposite of the picture given in Cornwell’s Hitler’s Pope. Other research has focused on Catholic clergy in Germany75. Redefining “resistance” to include not just open political opposition but multifarious forms of passive resistance (for example, refusing to display the swastika and focusing sermons on traditional Catholic teachings)76, the research shows that a significant proportion (nearly half of the 27,000 priests) were subjected to various forms of intimidation and repression (from warnings and interrogations to deportation and execution)77. Typical was a report from the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) on 20 October 1939: “Time and again, it is stressed that the current war is a punishment from God for the godlessness and immorality of the National Socialist leadership”78.
74. Riebling M. Church of Spies: The Pope’s Secret War against Hitler. New York, 2015. For earlier accounts, see: Ludlow P. Papst Pius XII., die Britische Regierung und die deutsche Opposition im Winter 1939/40 // Vierteljahrsheft für Zeitgeschichte. 1974. Vol. 22. S. 299–341.

75. For example, Kißener M. Catholics in the Third Reich: A Historical Introduction // Catholics and the Third Reich / eds K.-J. Hummel, M. Kißener. Boston, 2018. P. 13–36.

76. Becker W. Christen und der Widerstand. Forschungsstand und Forschungsperspektiven // Kirchen im Krieg. Europa 1939–1945 / hg. K.-J. Hummel, Ch. Kösters. Paderborn, 2010. P. 473–485.

77. Repgen K. Die deutschen Bischöfe… S. 142. In a case study of Berlin diocese, Kevin Spicer found that 30.3% of the priests were subjected to some form of repression – from warnings to arrest and extra-judicial punishment. Spicer K. Resisting the Third Reich: The Catholic Clergy in Hitler’s Berlin. DeKalb, 2004. Р. 73. In a later study Spicer focused on “brown [pro-Nazi] priests,” with an analysis of 138 clergymen who openly supported the Nazis (about half of whom joined the party). It bears noting that these constituted a tiny fraction of the clergy (0.5%).

78. Berichte des SD und der Gestapo über Kirchen und Kirchenvolk in Deutschland 1934–1944 / hg. H. Boberach. Mainz, 1971. S. 356.
27 Some of the most interesting scholarship has focused on the Curia, not the pope, thereby serving to depersonalize papal governance and to recognize the critical role of others. Going beyond the endless debates about the pope’s response to the Jewish deportations from Rome, Stefan Samerski’s Pancratius Pfeiffer explores hitherto unused archives of the Salvatorian order to show the critical role of a papal intermediary in interaction with the occupying German authorities. Samerski shows how Pius acted informally to shield, appeal, and provision Jews (and others) from the occupying forces79. Matthias Daufratshofer (University of Münster) published his doctoral dissertation of the role of Franz Hürth as a “holy ghostwriter” for three major papal encyclicals. Contrary to the traditional assumption that the pope himself composed these documents, Daufratshofer shows how the theological staff in the Vatican played a critical role in drafting and compiling these documents80. Other scholars have given much attention to the “missing encyclical,” which Pius XI commissioned in the year before his death but died before promulgating it. Pius XII, evidently fearful of provoking German wrath or because he was dissatisfied with the incomplete state of the text, destroyed that text shortly after his predecessor’s death. But scholars have found French, English, and German drafts of that encyclical in the personal archives of the outsiders whom Pius XI invited to compile the text81.
79. Samerski S. Pancratius Pfeiffer der verlängerte Arm von Pius XII. Der Salvatorianogeneral und die deutsche Besetzung Roms 1943/1944. Paderborn, 2013.

80. Daufratshofer M. Das päpstliche Lehramt auf dem Prüfstand der Geschichte. Franz Hürth SJ als „Holy Ghostwriter“ von Pius XI. und Pius XII. Freiburg, 2021.

81. Much energy has been expended on reconstructing this text from the personal archives of those who had been commissioned to draft it. For the history of the text and copies of the different drafts, see: Passelecq G., Suchesky B. The Hidden Encyclical of Pius XI. New York, 1997; Wider den Rassismus. Entwurf einer nicht erschienenen Enzyklika (1938). Texte aus dem Nachlaß von Gustav Gundlach SJ / hg. A. Rauscher. Paderborn, 2001; Brechenmacher Th. Die “interschlagene enzyklika” societatis unio und Pius XII // Römische Quartalschrift für Christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte. 2014. Bd. 109. S. 119–133.
28 Other scholars have published critical assessments of sources, especially diplomatically, that loomed large in the earlier historiography. One excellent example is the close analysis of diplomatic reports stemming from Ernst von Weizsäcker. After serving at the foreign ministry in Berlin, in 1943–1945 Weizsäcker was the German ambassador to the Vatican and filed reports to Berlin that figured prominently in earlier scholarship. As Jobst Knigge (journalist, Hamburg) has demonstrated, Weizsäcker was unsympathetic to the Nazis and looked to the Vatican as a possible mediator with the Allies (to avoid a repetition of the Versailles Treaty). To gain Berlin’s ear, he portrayed the pope as blindly anticommunist – an assessment directly at odds with his own diary. That finding undermines the argument of previous anti-Pius historians that the papacy was soft on fascism precisely because of a monomaniacal anticommunism82.
82. Knigge J. Der Botschafter und der Papst: Weizsäcker und Pius XII. Die deutsche Vatikanbotschaft 1943–1945. Hamburg, 2008. For an early critique of the Weizsäcker diplomatic reports, see: Chadwick O. Weizsäcker, the Vatican, and the Jews of Rome // Journal of Ecclesiastical History. 1977. Vol. 28. P. 179–199.
29 The exploration of new, non-Vatican sources has also helped to provide a more complex picture of the Holy See. A recent doctoral dissertation by Sister Martina Cucchiara examines in detail how her order, the Poor School Sisters of Notre Dame, fared during Nazi rule. One striking discovery is that the Nazi appeal also extended to young women: the number of new novices dropped significantly (by 46% in 1937), and after 1936 some 60% of the nuns left the religious order. At the same time, the dissertation also shows that the women assumed new roles–and influence–while serving in state schools and social work83.
83. Cucchiara M. “Bitter Tears”: The Poor School Sisters of Notre Dame in Hitler’s Germany, 1933 to 1945: PhD diss. University of Notre Dame, 2011.
30 Recent research has done much to deconstruct mythologies about the Vatican as a highly centralized, omnipotent administrative center84. The Vatican staff was, first of all, relatively small; its offices were severely understaffed, underfunded and hardly in a position to control a global empire of bishops and believers. Nor was its communications system as perfect as some imagined: the papacy relied mainly on the fascist Italian newspaper, irregularly and belatedly received newspapers from the outside, forcing the pope himself to rely mainly on the 11.30 pm broadcasts of the BBC for news85. The image that the pope had a global empire of bishops and priests reporting directly to the Vatican could hardly be more remote from reality86. Nor were the communications secure. The Vatican did develop its own codes, but these were primitive and easily broken by both sides. Then, too, the experience of World War I–when both sides used propaganda of alleged war crimes–was fresh in Pacelli’s memory. Nor did the propaganda war end in World War II; the British, for example, actively engaged in “black propaganda” through its Political Warfare Executive to flood international news with false and misleading stories87. The Vatican itself was infiltrated by a substantial corps of informers working for the Axis powers88. As a result, Pius had to be careful to protect key secrets and therefore committed little to paper89. There are also reports that, fearful of compromising documents falling into German hands, Pius burned documents90.
84. Godman P. Hitler and the Vatican. Inside the Secret Archives that Reveal the New Story of the Nazis and the Church. New York, 2004. P. XIV.

85. Alvarez D. Spies in the Vatican. Espionage & Intrigue from Napoleon to Holocaust. Lawrence, 2002. P. 274.

86. Chadwick O. The Pope and the Jews in 1942 // Church History. 1984. Vol. 21. P. 435–472. The Vatican was hardly enamored by the nuncio reports that it did receive. Domenico Tardini, a close aide to Pacelli, decorated nuncio reports with such blunt accolades as “Imbecile.” Alvarez D. Op. cit. P. 270.

87. Alvarez D., Graham R. Nothing Sacred: Nazi Espionage against the Vatican, 1939–1945. London, 1997. P. 14. See also: Alvarez D. Op. cit. Significantly, this volume drew upon the personal papers of Robert Graham (one of the four Jesuits who compiled ADSS), but these are no longer publicly accessible.

88. Chadwick O. Britain and the Vatican… P. 435–472.

89. Alvarez D., Graham R. Op. cit. P. 27.

90. Ibid. P. 35. For a concrete instance see the memoir of the nun who managed the papal household for decades: Lehnert P. His Humble Servant. Sister M. Pascalina Lehnert’s Memoirs of Her Years of Service to Eugenio Pacelli, Pope Pius XII. South Bend (IN), 2014. P. 116.
31 During the 2010s, several substantial historiographical works analyzing the stages in the evolution of the historiography were also published. Among them is an article by Giovanni Preziosi, “The Pius XII Dossier: Half a Century of Black Legend and Historiographical Discussions when tested by archives”91. Preziosi, who belongs to the pro-Pius school, argues that it was during World War II that the Catholic Church put the dignity of the human beings as the basis of its activities, and thereby began to show its solidarity with the victims of Nazism and fascism. Preziosi claims that the Vatican and religious orders were the only ones who stood up for the Jews, although the anti-fascists were no less aware of the crimes committed.
91. Preziosi G. Op. cit. P. 185–276.
32 Another solid historiographical overview is the article by R. Regoli, “The Pontificate of Pius XII: myths, apologies and counter-versions”92. Regoli, like many others, notes that the year 1963 was a turning point in public opinion and in the historical memory of this pontificate. However, Regoli advances a new explanation: the shift, he argues, was influenced by the Israeli abduction and the subsequent trial and execution of Adolf Eichmann in 1962 as a war criminal. To explain why criticism of Pope Pius XII was renewed in the following years, Regoli argues that since the 1970s the memory of the Holocaust has become one of the ways to strengthen Jewish identity. Noting the second wave of criticism that came at the turn of the 1990s–2000s, Regoli cites the actions of the Israeli Ambassador to the Vatican, Aaron Lopez, who demanded a moratorium on the beatification of Pius XII. Reminding readers that in 2002 the film “Amen” by Konstantin Costa-Gavras (based on the plot of Hochhut’s play) was released, Regoli notes that since the beginning of the 2000s, the demarcation line has been drawn not between religious, but between political groups: on the one hand, Catholic liberals and progressives (in a number of areas), on the other, Catholic conservatives, Protestants, and Jews. Regoli also notes that despite the repeated demands to open archives, many works continue to be journalistic in nature, regardless of the archival collections already available, and this suggests that the opening of the Pius XII archives will change little.
92. Regoli R. Il pontificato di Pio XII. Mito, apologia e controversie // Vivarium. 2019. Vol. 27. P. 15–24.
33 In March 2020, for one week (before the coronavirus pandemic closed the reading room), thirty historians had an opportunity to make a preliminary exploration of the new materials–a mountain of documents amounting to some 200,000 archival units (twice that of archive of the Pius XI papacy)93. Shortly after this brief foray into the newly opened archive, the German weekly Die Zeit published several articles about the experience of the seven-member Münster team led by Hubert Wolf. Even in that brief time the team was able to establish that Pius XII had indeed seen the 27 September 1942 report from the Geneva Office of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (with gruesome details about the Nazi campaign to exterminate Jews). The existence of this report was already well known, but not that it had come to pope’s attention. The Münster team in fact found evidence that he had indeed read the report94. However, as Wolf notes, even if Pius knew of the atrocities, “the question is: did he believe it?”95. In June 2020 the Vatican archives, including the Apostolic Archive (formerly the Secret Archive) reopened, with limits on the number of readers and the number of files available each day (five). On 5 May 2021 Fordham University hosted a seminar featuring scholars who had conducted research since the reopening and who could give an interim report on their findings96. None of Wolf’s team made any earthshaking discoveries, but the general consensus was that: (1) the new access will add nuances to the existing information about the war years (given the availability of ADSS and other sources); and (2) new materials on the postwar years will be far more significant (since so little had been previously available)97.
93. The estimates come from the leading German expert on the “secret Vatican archive”: Wolf H. Papst Pius XII. P. 280; Idem. Papst & Teufel. S. 17.

94. Wolf H. et al. Der Papst, der wusste und schwieg // Die Zeit. 23.IV.2020.

95. Wolf H. Plötzlich wurde der Papst zum Sündenbock // Die Zeit. 23.IV.2020.

96. David Kertzer claims to have found serious evidence of the Vatican’s refusal to intervene on behalf of the Jews and produces two documents to support that claim. In fact, these are two documents by subordinates, one of whom supports a public pronouncement, and Kertzer offers no evidence that this ever came before Pius XII. It is hardly breaking news that the conservative factions of the Curia were least inclined to compromise the Vatican’s neutral status. For Kertzer’s article (chiefly about the postwar case of two converted orphans, but with the two documents from 1943), see the original article in The Atlantic (August 2020): Kertzer D. The Popes, the Jews, and the Secrets in the Archives // URL: >>>> (access date: 15.10.2021). Despite its insignificance and Kertzer’s mischaracterization, the article elicited prominent attention in the press: Unsealed Archives Give New Clues to Pope Pius XII’s Response to the Holocaust // New York Times. 28.VIII.2020. In any case, as the recent study by Johan Ickx abundantly demonstrates (based on ten years’ research in the archives, not five days), the Vatican’s role in World War II is far more complex than the half-baked first impressions might suggest. See his superb new book: Ickx J. Le Bureau: les Juifs de Pie XII. Paris, 2020.

97. The Pius XII Archives and the Jews: First Notes and Research Hypotheses // URL: >>>> (access date: 15.10.2021).
34 In conclusion, the historiography on the Vatican in World War II suggests several lines of development. First, the research shows an extraordinary empiricization: an enormous expansion and diversification in the source base. If in the 1960s historians had to rely mainly on the diplomatic reports of various states, they now have at their disposal the entire archives from the papacy of Pius XI and Pius XII, as well as a huge complex of official Catholic archives abroad (notably, in Germany) as well as sundry personal archival collections. Second, scholarship had undergone a depersonalization, moving beyond a narrow focus on Pius XII to other officials in the Curia, and indeed some outsiders mobilized to advise on specific tasks (for example, the “missing” encyclopedia). Textological research has shown how major (not just marginal) documents were compiled, and reflected a spectrum of views and interests within the Curia. Pius XII was a workabholic, but a sickly one, and in any case it is an illusion to imagine that he was able to micromanage so complex and diversified an institution. Third, the new scholarship draws attention to the dynamics and limits of institutionalization: this pygmy-state of 44 hectares, being slowly rebuilt after 1870, had limited resources (human and material), and on any database of “state capacity” must rank near the bottom98. Stereotypes about a super-efficient and powerful organization bear no relationship to reality/ Fourth, the interaction of the Vatican and Catholic churches abroad demonstrate not a globalization of papal power, but an irresistible process of glocalization. For all the rhetoric about ultramontanism and papal power, in fact Catholicism had become and remained highly local–each country, indeed each diocese, showed a kaleidoscopic variety in response to the war and its challenges. In urging diocesan authorities to act at their own discretion, Pius XII was not inventing a strategy but recognizing a reality. Fifth, the new research has demonstrated the need for historicization. As multiple researchers have emphasized, Pius–and other key actors–were profoundly affected by the pre-war experiences. Moreover, it is important to incorporate that historical context. While globalization has made much ado about the “communications revolution” from the mid-nineteenth century, the cheerful globalist perspective must be adjusted for the negative side: the instantaneous dissemination not only of information, but also disinformation. The pejorative “fake news” arose already in the late nineteenth century and gained momentum from the “black propaganda” of worlds I and II. If Vatican officials were distrustful of reports, that was entirely consistent with a general skepticism toward news media and other reports. Neither the Vatican nor even well-developed states had the capacity to verify that information, and neither were eager to accept it at face value.
98. For the World Bank’s dataset and conceptualization of “state capacity”, see: URL: >>>> (access date: 13.08.2020). Revealingly, the Vatican state does not even appear in the World Bank global database on state capacity: URL: >>>> (access date: 13.08.2020).

References

1. Krasnov P.P. Deyatel'nost' Vatikana v Nyurnbergskom protsesse: k postanovke voprosa // Gramota. 2011. № 2. S. 94–96.

2. Krasnov P.P. Okno v Ameriku: diplomatiya kardinala Pachelli // Intellekt. Innovatsii. Investitsii. 2011. № 1. S. 160–163.

3. Krasnov P.P. Papa rimskij Pij XII v sovetskoj i rossijskoj istoriografii // Sovremennye issledovaniya sotsial'nykh problem. 2012. № 4 (12). URL: https://www.elibrary.ru/item.asp?id-17765248 (data obrascheniya: 17.10.2020).

4. Krasnov P.P. Transatlanticheskaya diplomatiya papy Piya XII i F. Ruzvel'ta v period Vtoroj mirovoj vojny // Vestnik Orenburgskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. 2010. № 5. S. 4–11.

5. Riveli M.A. Arkhiepiskop genotsida: Monsen'or Stepinats, Vatikan i ustashskaya diktatura v Khorvatii 1941–1945 gg. M., 2011.

6. Krasnov P.P. Deiatel’nost’ Vatikana v Niurnbergskom protsesse: k postanovke voprosa [Vatican Activity in Nuremberg Process: Problem Statement] // Gramota [Charter]. 2011. № 2. S. 94–96. (In Russ.)

7. Krasnov P.P. Okno v Evropu: diplomatiia kardinala Pacelli [Window to Europe: the Diplomacy of Cardinal Pacelli] // Intellect. Innovatsii. Investitsii [Intellect. Innovations. Investments]. 2011. № 1. S. 160–163. (In Russ.)

8. Krasnov P.P. Papa rimskii Pii XII v sovetskoi i rossiskoi istoriografii [Pope Pius XII in Soviet and Russian Historiography] // Sovremennyie issledovaniia sotsial’nykh problem [Modern Studies of Social Issues]. 2012. № 4 (12). https://www.elibrary.ru/item.asp?id-17765248 (access date: 17.10.2020).

9. Krasnov P.P. Transatlanticheskaia diplomatiia papy Piia XII i F. Roosevelt v period Vtoroi mirovoi voiny [Transatlantic Diplomacy of Pope Pius XII and F. Roosevelt during the Second World war] // Vestnik Orenburgskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta [Bulletin of the Orenburg State University]. 2010. № 5. S. 4–11. (In Russ.)

10. Rivelli M.A. Arkhiepiskop genotsida: Monsenior Stepinats, Vatikan i ustashskaia diktatura v Khorvatii, 1941–1945 [Archbishop of Genocide: Monsignor Stepinac, Vatican and Ustashian Dictatorship in Croatia, 1941–1945]. Moskva, 2011. (In Russ.)

11. Acts et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale. Vol. 11 / eds P. Blet, R. Graham, A. Martini, B. Schneider. Vatican City, 1965–1981.

12. Adolph W. Verfälschte Geschichte; Antwort an Rolf Hochhuth, mit Dokumenten und authentischen Berichten. Berlin, 1963.

13. Akten deutscher Bischöfe über die Lage der Kirche 1933 bis 1945. Bd. 1–6 / hg. B. Stasiewski, V. Ludwig. Mainz, 1968–1985.

14. Alvarez D. Spies in the Vatican. Espionage & Intrigue from Napoleon to Holocaust. Lawrence, 2002.

15. Alvarez D., Graham R. Nothing Sacred: Nazi Espionage against the Vatican, 1939–1945. London, 1997.

16. Becker W. Christen und der Widerstand. Forschungsstand und Forschungsperspektiven // Kirchen im Krieg. Europa 1939–1945 / hg. K.-J. Hummel, Ch. Kösters. Paderborn, 2010. S. 473–485.

17. Bentley E. The Storm over the Deputy. Essays and Articles about Hochhuth’s Explosive Drama. New York, 2004.

18. Berichte des SD und der Gestapo über Kirchen und Kirchenvolk in Deutschland 1934–1944 / hg. H. Boberach. Mainz, 1971.

19. Besier G., Piombo F. Der Heilige Stuhl und Hitler-Deutschland. Die Faszination des Totalitären. München, 2004.

20. Blet P. Pius XII and the Second World War. According to the Archives of the Vatican. New York, 1997.

21. Bobbio A. Oltre la barriera del pericolo // Jesus. 2004. Vol. 2. P. 65.

22. Bottum J. The End of the Pius Wars // First Things. 2000. Vol. 142. P. 18–24.

23. Brechenmacher Th. Die “interschlagene enzyklika” societatis unio und Pius XII // Römische Quartalschrift für Christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte. 2014. Bd. 109. S. 119–133.

24. Brechenmacher Th. Pius XII. und kein Ende. Neues – Gelungenes, Fragwürdiges und Verfehltes – über den Papst, den Weltkrieg und die Juden // Das historisch-politische Buch. 2000. Bd. 48. S. 95–103.

25. Brechenmacher Th. The Church and the Jews // Catholics and the Third Reich / eds K.-J. Hummel, M. Kißener. Boston, 2018. P. 127–145.

26. Brechenmacher Th. The Papacy and the Second World War // // Catholics and the Third Reich / eds K.-J. Hummel, M. Kißener. Boston, 2018. P. 181–197.

27. Brodie T. German Catholicism at War, 1939–1945. Oxford, 2018.

28. Buonaiuti E. Pio XII. Firenze, 1958.

29. Burg J.G. Sündenböcke. Grossangriffe des Zionismus auf Papst Pius XII. und auf die deutschen Regierungen. München, 1967.

30. Butz A.R. Robert Graham and Revisionism // Journal of Historical Review. 1998. Vol. 17. P. 24–25.

31. Chadwick O. Britain and the Vatican during the Second World War. New York, 1986.

32. Chadwick O. The Pope and the Jews in 1942 // Church History. 1984. Vol. 21. P. 435–472.

33. Chadwick O. Weizsäcker, the Vatican, and the Jews of Rome // Journal of Ecclesiastical History. 1977. Vol. 28. P. 179–199.

34. Chandler A. Catholicism and Protestantism in the Second World War in Europe // World Christianities c. 1914–c. 2000 / ed. H. McLeod. Cambridge, 2006. P. 262–284.

35. Chappel J. Catholic Modern: The Challenges of Totalitarianism and the Remaking of the Church. Cambridge (MA), 2018.

36. Chenaux P. L’eredità del magistero di Pio XII. Rome, 2010.

37. Chenaux P. Pio XII. Diplomatico e pastore. Cinisello Balsamo, 2004.

38. Connally J. Katholische Kirche und Rassenfrage in der Zwischenkriegszeit // Römische Quartalschrift für Christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte. 2014. Vol. 109. P. 7–23.

39. Conway J. The Vatican, Great Britain, and Relations with Germany, 1938–40 // Historical Journal. 1973. Vol. 16. P. 147–167.

40. Coppa F.J. Pope Pius XII: From the Diplomacy of Impartiality to the Silence of the Holocaust // Journal of Church and State. 2011. Vol. 55. P. 286–306.

41. Coppa F.J. The Life & Pontificate of Pope Pius XII. Between History and Controversy. Washington, 2013.

42. Cornwell J. Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII. New York, 1999.

43. Cucchiara M. “Bitter Tears”: The Poor School Sisters of Notre Dame in Hitler’s Germany, 1933 to 1945: PhD diss. University of Notre Dame, 2011.

44. Dalin D. The Myth of Hitler’s Pope. Washington, 2005.

45. Daufratshofer M. Das päpstliche Lehramt auf dem Prüfstand der Geschichte. Franz Hürth SJ als “Holy Ghostwriter” von Pius XI. und Pius XII. Freiburg, 2021.

46. Davidov D. Independent state of Croatia: Total genocide. 1941–1945. Belgrade, 2013.

47. Der Notenwechsel zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und der Deutschen Regierung / hg. D. Albrecht, U. von Hehl. Bd. 3. Mainz, 1965–1980.

48. Die Briefe Piur‘ XII. an die deutschen Bischöfe 1939–1944 / hg. V. Schneider, P. Blet, A. Martini. Mainz, 1966.

49. Doino W.Jr. An Annotated Bibliography of Works on Pius XII, the Second World War and the Holocaust // The Pius War: Responses to the Critics of Pius XII / eds J. Bottum, D. Dalin. Lanham, 2004. P. 97–280.

50. Eugenio Pacelli als Nuntius in Deutschland: Forschungsperspektiven und Ansätze zu einem internationalen Vergleich / hg. H. Wolf. Paderborn, 2012.

51. Eugenio Pacelli. Die Lage der Kirche in Deutschland 1929 / hg. H. Wolf, K. Unterburger. Paderborn, 2006.

52. Falconi C. Il silenzio di Pio XII. Milano, 1965.

53. Fattorini E. Hitler, Mussolini, and the Vatican: Pope Pius XI and the Speech That Was Never Made. Cambridge, 2011.

54. Feldkamp M. Goldhagens unwillige Kirche. Alte und neue Fälschungen über Kirche und Papst während der NS-Herrschaft. München, 2003.

55. Feldkamp M. Pius XII. Ein Papst für Geutschland, Europa und die Welt. Aachen, 2018.

56. Friedlander S. Pius XII und das Dritte Reich: eine Dokumentation. Hamburg, 1965.

57. Gallagher Ch. Vatican Secret Diplomacy: Joseph P. Hurlez and Pope Pius XII. New Haven, 2008.

58. Godman P. Hitler and the Vatican. Inside the Secret Archives that Reveal the New Story of the Nazis and the Church. New York, 2004.

59. Goldhagen D. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York, 1996.

60. Goldhagen D.J. A Moral Reckoning: The Role of the Catholic Church in the Holocaust and Its Unfulfilled Duty of Repair. New York, 2002.

61. Goñi U. The Real Odessa. New York, 2002.

62. Griech-Polelle, Beth A. Bishop von Galen: German Catholicism and National Socialism. New Haven, 2002.

63. Hastings D. Catholicism and the Roots of Nazism: Religious Identity and National Socialism. New York, 2010.

64. Hatch A., Walshe S. Crown of Glory: The Life of Pope Pius XII. New York, 1957.

65. Hehl U. von et al. Priester unter Hitlers Terror. Eine biographische und statistische Erhebung. Bd. 1–2. Paderborn, 1998.

66. Hlond A. The Persecution of the Catholic Church in German-Occupied Poland. Reports Presented by H.E. Cardinal Hlond, Primate of Poland, to Pope Pius XII, Vatican Broadcasts and Other Reliable Evidence. New York, 1941.

67. Hummel K.-J. The German Bishops: Pastoral Care and Politics // Catholics and the Third Reich / eds K.-J. Hummel, M. Kißener. Boston, 2018. P. 103–126.

68. Hürten H. Katholische Kirche und nationalsozialistischer Krieg // Die deutschen Eliten und der Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg. München, 1989. S. 135–179.

69. Ickx J. Le Bureau: les Juifs de Pie XII. Paris, 2020.

70. In difesa di Pio XII. Le ragioni della storia / a cura di G.M. Vian. Venezia, 2009.

71. Johnson W. Blood Libel and the Pius War: A Bibliographic Review of the Roman Catholic Church and the Holocaust // Journal of Religious & Theological Information. 2020. Vol. 19. P. 57–69.

72. Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus, 1930–1945: Ein Bericht in Quellen / hg. H. Gruber. Paderborn, 2006.

73. Kertzer D. The Pope and Mussolini. The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe. New York, 2014.

74. Kertzer D. The Popes Against the Jews: The Vatican’s Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism. New York, 2001.

75. Kißener M. Catholics in the Third Reich: A Historical Introduction // Catholics and the Third Reich / eds K.-J. Hummel, M. Kißener. Boston, 2018. P. 13–36.

76. Knigge J. Der Botschafter und der Papst: Weizsäcker und Pius XII. Die deutsche Vatikanbotschaft 1943–1945. Hamburg, 2008.

77. Kornberg J. The Pope’s Dilemma: Pius XII Faces Atrocities and Genocide in the Second World War. Buffalo (NY), 2015.

78. Kösters Ch. Catholics in the Third Reich: An Introduction to the Scholarship and Research History // Catholics and the Third Reich / eds K.-J. Hummel, M. Kißener. Boston, 2018. P. 37–60.

79. Kühlwein K. Papst Pius XII. – sein schwerster Fehler Die Deportation der römischen Juden nach Auschwitz. Freiburg im Breisgau, 2011.

80. Kühlwein K. Pius XII. und die Deportation der Juden Roms. Berlin, 2019.

81. Lapide P. Three Popes and the Jews. New York, 1967.

82. Lawler J.G. Were the Popes against the Jews? Tracking the Myths, Confronting the Ideologues. Grand Rapids, 2012.

83. Lehnert P. His Humble Servant. Sister M. Pascalina Lehnert’s Memoirs of Her Years of Service to Eugenio Pacelli, Pope Pius XII. South Bend (IN), 2014.

84. Lewy G. The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany. New York, 1964.

85. Ludlow P. Papst Pius XII., die Britische Regierung und die deutsche Opposition im Winter 1939/40 // Vierteljahrsheft für Zeitgeschichte. 1974. Bd. 22. S. 299–341.

86. Marchione M. Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace. Mahwah (NJ), 2000.

87. McInerny R. The Defamation of Pius XII. South Bend (IN), 2001.

88. Miccoli G. I dilemmi e i silenzi di Pio XII. Vaticano, Seconda guerra mondiale e Shoah. Milano, 2000.

89. Neuhäusler J. Kreuz und Hakenkreuz. Der Kampf des Nationalsozialismus gegen die katholische Kirche unter kirchliche Widerstand. Bd. 1–2. München, 1946.

90. O’Shea P. A Cross Too Heavy: Pope Pius XII and the Jews of Europe. New York, 2011.

91. Passelecq G., Suchesky B. The Hidden Encyclical of Pius XI. New York, 1997.

92. Phayer M. Pius XII, the Holocaust, and the Cold War. Bloomington, 2008.

93. Phayer M. The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930–1965. Bloomington, 2000.

94. Pio XII. Il dibattito storiografico: punti di arrivo e problemi aperti. Atti del convegno. Trento, 2005.

95. Pius XII and the Holocaust. Current State of Research / eds D. Bankier, D. Michman, I. Nidam-Orvieto. Jerusalem, 2012.

96. Pius XII, the Holocaust and the Revisionists / ed. P. Gallo. Jefferson (NC), 2006.

97. Pollard J. The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, 1914–1958. Oxford, 2014.

98. Pollard J. The Papacy in Two World Wars: Benedict XV and Pius XII Compared // Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions. 2001. Vol. 2. P. 83–96.

99. Preziosi G. Dossier Pio XII: Mezzo secolo di leggenda nera e di dibattito storiografico alla prova degli archivi // Christianitas. Rivista di Storia Pensiero e Cultura del Cristianesimo. 2013. Vol. 1. P. 185–276.

100. Regoli R. Il pontificato di Pio XII. Mito, apologia e controversie // Vivarium. 2019. Vol. 27. P. 25–48.

101. Repgen K. Die deutschen Bischöfe und der zweite Weltkrieg // Annuario de historia de la Iglesia. 1995. Vol. 4. S. 97–146.

102. Repgen K. Judenpogrom, Rassenideologie und katholische Kirche 1938. Köln, 1988.

103. Repgen K. P. Robert Leiber SJ, der Kronzeuge für die Vatikanische Politik beim Reichskonkordat 1933 // Das Reichskonkordat 1933 / hg. Th. Brechenmacher. Paderborn, 2007. S. 25–36.

104. Riccardi A. Der längste Winter. Die vergessene Geschichte der Juden im besetzten Rom 1943/44. Darmstadt, 2018.

105. Riebling M. Church of Spies: The Pope’s Secret War against Hitler. New York, 2015.

106. Rossi E. Il manganello e l’aspersorio. Roma, 1957.

107. Rychlak R. Hitler, the War and the Pope. Huntington (IN), 2000.

108. Rychlak R. Righteous Gentiles: How Pius XII and the Catholic Church Saved Half a Million Jews from the Nazis. Dallas, 2005.

109. Sale G., Bobbio A. La Chiesa e la “Shoah”. Resistenza in convent // Jesus. 2004. Vol. 2. P. 62–68.

110. Samerski S. Deutschland und der Heilige Stuhl. Diplomatische Beziehungen 1920–1945. Münster, 2019.

111. Samerski S. Pancratius Pfeiffer der verlängerte Arm von Pius XII. Der Salvatorianogeneral und die deutsche Besetzung Roms 1943/1944. Paderborn, 2013.

112. Scheinmann M.M. Der Vatikan in Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin, 1954.

113. Schmitt M. Das “Schweigen” Pius’ XII, zur Judenverfolgung im Spiegel von Selbstzeugnissen und Äußerungen seiner Mitarbeiter und Vertrauten. Aadorf, 2008.

114. Spicer K. Resisting the Third Reich: The Catholic Clergy in Hitler’s Berlin. DeKalb, 2004.

115. The Pius War: Responses to the Critics of Pius XII / eds J. Bottum, D. Dalin. Lanham, 2004.

116. Toscano M. La Santa Sede e le vittime del nazismo // L’Osservatore della Domenica. 1964. Vol. 26. P. 65–67.

117. Triulcio P. La Storia come fine o come mezzo? Una riflessione sui presunti “silenzi” di Pio XII // Vivarium. 2019. Vol. 27. P. 131–134.

118. Ventresca R. The Life of Pope Pius XII. Cambridge, 2013.

119. Wider den Rassismus. Entwurf einer nicht erschienenen Enzyklika (1938). Texte aus dem Nachlaß von Gustav Gundlach SJ / hg. A. Rauscher. Paderborn, 2001.

120. Wolf H. Papst Pius XII. und die Juden // Theologische Revue. 2009. Bd. 105. S. 265–280.

121. Wolf H. Papst und Teufel: Die Archive des Vatikan und das Dritte Reich. München, 2008.

122. Zuccotti S. Under His Very Window: The Vatican and the Holocaust in Italy. New Haven, 2000.

Comments

No posts found

Write a review
Translate